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## THE FORMATION AND EVOLUTION OF EURASIAN THOUGHTS AND CONCEPTS

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**Abstract:** The concept of "Eurasianism" is rooted in the philosophical ideas of the early 20th century, emphasizing the unity of the post-Soviet space and its special, non-Western path of development. Recently, the world order has been put to the test of strength: global challenges put states in front of the need to revise the existing world order, which forms a favorable ground for the implementation of the idea of Eurasianism in a regional perspective. Today, the idea of Eurasianism is institutionalized within the framework of the CIS and the EAEU and is especially relevant in the context of new global challenges (economic instability, changing nature of the international order, epidemiological threat, etc.), which allow us to talk about the emergence of a new world order. The article also examines the development of the Eurasian economy through the prism of the relationship between the processes of globalization and regionalization. Globalization is interpreted as an objective process of internationalization of the world economy, the peculiarities of the involvement of the economies of the Eurasian countries in it are revealed. The subjective side of globalization as a form of economic policy of the developed countries of the world in their own interests and its consequences are shown. The trends of regionalization in the economies of the Eurasian countries are revealed. It is proved that the increasing regionalization objectively leads to a significantly different world order than globalization — to a multipolar world.

**Keywords:** Eurasianism, geopolitics, Greater Eurasia, non-Western IR theory, episteme, plurality.

### Introduction

The notion of Eurasianism has been present for an extensive period. This trend in Russian historical and geopolitical thought emerged in the early 1920s, with its birth marked by the release of the collection "Exodus to the East" in 1921 in Sofia. Individuals like Peter Savitsky, Nikolai Trubetskoy, and Vladimir Vernadsky had laid the groundwork for these ideas in the early 20th century. It was an endeavor by the Russian intellectual elite to define Russia's position in global history, aiming to supplant the crumbling communist ideology and serve as a rationale for preserving the unity of the Russian state. Essentially, the Eurasians proposed their version of a national ethos. The heightened interest in Eurasianism in the late 1980s and early 1990s was primarily due to the collapse of the communist ideology, which had long been the ideological foundation for unifying the peoples of Russia under a single state during the Soviet era. (Belyakov, 2008: 413)

Eurasianism suggests exploring a third path for state development. It acknowledges that the Western system isn't suitable for Russia while emphasizing that focusing solely on the

Slavic people isn't viable either. Instead, it advocates for a union where various peoples, having coexisted in the Eurasian territory for centuries, can create a more stable nation. Initially, in the Soviet Union, Lev Nikolaevich Gumilev was the sole proponent of Svarazhianism for many years. However, prior to Gumilev, other scholars viewed this third way solely as a functional unit—a means for the survival of peoples. Gumilev brought a distinctive approach, fully embracing Eurasianism and advocating for the Russian-Turkic-Mongolian brotherhood irrespective of changing circumstances.

Lev Nikolaevich introduced several groundbreaking concepts within Eurasianism. Initially, he delved into the roots of global Eurocentrism. His theory attributed this phenomenon to the European "superethnos," characterized by an egocentric psychology that perceives its group as inherently flawless—an attribute not universally shared by all ethnic groups. For instance, Eurasians, as per Gumilev, don't incline toward expansionism or glorification of their ethnicity over others. Additionally, he explained why Eurasians aren't inclined to align with Europeans, noting that the Russian "superethnos" is 500 years younger than the Romano-German one. Hence, any adoption of Western ideas by force wouldn't yield favorable outcomes. Gumilev's contributions shifted the discourse of Eurasianism away from the realms of politics and religion, which had previously dominated discussions. He refuted the influence of these factors on ongoing processes, diverging from prior debates about Catholicism versus Orthodoxy, Islam's hostility, or the compatibility of democracy and liberalism with Eurasian perspectives. (Gumilev 2004, 321-327) However, Gumilev's most significant innovation was the theory of passionarity. He argued that passionate movements determined modern Eurasia's state and emphasized the mutual necessity of the Slavs and Turks for each other. This theory also debunked a core myth upheld by the Slavophiles. While recognizing that Russia or Eurasia isn't the solitary center of the world, Gumilev contended that it is one among several centers—an idea foundational to the modern political concept of a multipolar world.

The first part of the article discusses the theories and authors of the formation of Eurasian thoughts and concepts. The second subparagraph of the first section contains the history of the creation and the states that led to the creation of the first, that is, Eurasianism and the main issues on the topic "the fourth way". The second section of the article examines the nuances of Eurasian politics, emphasizing the idea of regionalizing the Eurasian economy and fostering a multipolar world. The article further explores Vladimir Putin's role in foreign policy, focusing on his adherence to Eurasian principles. It references a Pew Global Attitudes Project survey conducted in 2007 and 2022, demonstrating the levels of trust various states placed in the Russian state and its president. The second section of the article examines the nuances of Eurasian politics, emphasizing the idea of regionalizing the Eurasian economy and fostering a multipolar world.

The emergence of Eurasianism as a facet of Russian historiosophical and geopolitical thought occurred in the early 1920s. In the early 20th century, Russian historical science distinctly recognized the trajectory known as "Eurasianism." The development of the Eurasianist concept reached its zenith in the 1920s at the University of Prague, a hub for many Russian professors and educators who had departed Russia following the October Revolution of 1917. The organized movement of Eurasianism took form with the release of the compilation "Journey to the East" in Sofia in 1921, featuring writings by individuals from diverse fields such as P. Suvchinsky, P. Savitsky, N. Trubetskoy, and G. Florovsky—all united by a cohesive ideology. The introduction to the compilation asserted that any contemporary contemplation of Russia's future trajectory should be influenced by the methods that have already evolved in the past, or more precisely, the very formulation of the Russian problem. The Eurasians' historical perspectives drew on Spengler's theory outlined in his book "The Decline of Europe" regarding the crisis of European culture, as well as Kaiserling's closely aligned views on one hand, and the Slavophiles' notions about the uniqueness of Russia's development on the other. According to the Eurasians, modernity was depicted not as

a transitional phase but as a pivotal moment that would supplant the Western European world from the East. They identified Russia's essence specifically in its primal Russian-Asian connections, considering them more traditional than the Western links that emerged much later and were predominantly imposed artificially from above. Eurasianism stands out as one of the most prominent emigrant movements, maintaining its unity for just over a decade and successfully attracting nearly all intellectual emigrant youth in various locations such as Sofia, Prague, Paris, Berlin, Yugoslavia, and America.(Shirokov 2008: 196) The viewpoints of Eurasians found expression in the literature of the 1920s through publications like the "Eurasian Time Book," "Eurasian Chronicle," and the newspaper "Eurasia," circulated in Berlin, Paris, and Prague. Eurasians placed significant emphasis on the Orthodox faith and the broader concept of the "Exodus to the East." Let's examine the primary objectives that Eurasianism pursued as an ideological and political trend during these years. Noteworthy figures of Eurasianism, including N.S. Trubetskoy, N.N. Alekseev, G.V. Vernadsky, and P.N. Savitsky, left behind a substantial literary legacy. According to O.C. Shirokov's insightful evaluation, their work contains "numerous brilliant insights and foresight that may appear prophetic to contemporary Russian readers". (Shirokov 2008: 208) This legacy enables scholars to discuss the distinct forms of Eurasianism associated with Trubetskoy, Alekseev, Vernadsky, and Savitsky. Notably, P.N. Savitsky held a central position as the foremost Eurasian. It is acknowledged that Savitsky authored many foundational works that shaped the Eurasianist movement. His intellectual pursuits spanned a wide array of disciplines, including philosophy, history, economics, geography, politics, and geopolitics. Savitsky's Eurasian concept, particularly its focus on the East, exerted a significant influence on the Eurasianism of L.N. Gumilev, who considered himself, to some extent, a disciple of Savitsky (1997).

As P.N. Savitsky emphasized, Eurasians embody a fresh start in both thought and life. They constitute a collective of individuals engaged in reevaluating fundamental and life-shaping matters, grounded in a new perspective that has emerged from the experiences of the past decade. This perspective entails a radical transformation of the previously dominant worldview and life system. Simultaneously, Eurasians offer a novel geographical and historical interpretation of Russia and the entire world, referred to as Russian or "Eurasian." Savitsky has consistently highlighted the Eurasian belief that the progress of Russia is intricately linked to the establishment of a Eurasian civilization. In elucidating the core of Eurasian terminology, he emphasized the attribution of cultural and historical significance to concepts such as "Europe" and "Asia." Consequently, the term "Eurasia" takes on the significance of a succinct cultural and historical descriptor. (Savitsky 1997: 81) Eurasians, particularly Savitsky and Trubetskoy, expressed a preference for the Eastern origins of the Russian ethnic group and Eurasian culture. Their studies underscored the significance of the "Asian element" in shaping Russia's cultural identity and the progression of Russians towards the East. Eurasians extensively discussed the idea that the East has become deeply ingrained in the essence of Russia, constituting a fundamental aspect of the Russian spiritual and ethnic character. In one of Savitsky's articles titled "A Turn to the East," he reiterates this notion, posing questions such as, "Are there many individuals in Russia without Khazar or Polovtsian, Tatar or Bashkir, Mordovian or Chuvash heritage in their veins?" He further reflects on the connection between Russians and the Oriental spirit, encompassing its mysticism, affinity for contemplation, and, ultimately, contemplative leisure. (Savitsky 1997: 88)

The Eurasian perspective on Russian history for foreign audiences encompasses sports and a diverse range of viewpoints toward Northeast Eurasia (NE). This includes an examination of the Tatar-Mongolian period in Russia and the Eurasian osmosis referred to as "Genghis Khan's legacy". A central concept promoted by figures like Savitsky, Trubetsky, Vernadsky, and other non-governmental entities is the notion that the Mongols played a role in unifying Eurasia, challenging the foundations of its state and political structure. They assert that the Mongols, particularly the Golden Horde, contributed to the formation of a secure

centralized state. Historical evidence indicates that the Russians adopted the system of public administration from the Mongols, who, during the Golden Horde era, exercised authority and collected taxes from the Genghis generation. The Golden Horde, seen as the origin of Turkic states, has sparked a robust critique among contemporaries of historical narratives. (Savitsky 1997: 96) In the 1930s, historical circumstances led to the collapse of Eurasianism as a socio-political movement; however, its ideas proved to be remarkably influential. L. N. Gumilev emerged as the "last Eurasian" during the late 1940s to the early 1990s. The combination of classical Eurasianism and the perspectives of Russian cosmism played a pivotal role in shaping the work of L.N. Gumilev, a distinguished scientist. Under the influence of Eurasianism, he developed theories of ethnogenesis and passionarity, integrating the historical concepts of G. V. Vernadsky and the ideas of P. N. Savitsky (1997) into his works. In 1979, L.N. Gumilev completed his groundbreaking manuscript titled "Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere of the Earth," but it was not officially published in the USSR until a decade later, in (1989). In this book, the scholar effectively extends the ideas of P. N. Savitsky regarding the impact of geographical landscapes on ethnic traits. Gumilev proposes that ethnic groups, on one hand, evolve through historical processes, while on the other hand, their characteristics are linked to the biocenosis of the landscape in which they originated. He further developed N. S. Trubetskoy's Eurasian concept of a cultural and historical type by integrating it into the ethnic hierarchy and labeling it as a superethnos. Gumilev defined a superethnos as a collective of ethnic groups that simultaneously emerged in a specific region, interconnected by economic, ideological, and political ties. He emphasized that the determination of a superethnos is not based on size or power but solely on the degree of interethnic closeness. Eurasianism indeed emerged "out of feelings" and constructed its ideological and intellectual foundation based on these emotions. The movement stemmed from a bitter experience of feeling betrayed by Europe and a harsh realization: "we are not accepted in Europe." The discovery of this truth was more experienced than realized. Since we are not accepted there, then "we will turn our Asian face to you"! The arrival of Eurasianism was proclaimed by the influential Russian poet Alexander Blok. However, a century earlier, the eminent poet Alexander Pushkin observed that Europe consistently displayed ignorance and ingratitude in its treatment of Russia. Pushkin, with his rational perspective, refrained from categorizing Russia as part of Asia. (Savitsky 1997: 123)

His observations pertained to a geopolitical context deeply embedded in the Middle Ages, characterized by a Romano-German (Catholic) Europe and a Greek-Slavic (Orthodox) Europe that had fallen under Turkish dominance. The delineating boundary of the Eurasian continent represents both a historical fact and a scientific convention. It appears peculiar that the Europe-Asia dichotomy could lead to emotional experiences. It is crucial to note that L. N. Gumilev did not align himself with Eurasianism during his lifetime and only began discussing it in the late 1980s to early 1990s. This period coincided with heightened public interest in his works. His notable statement, "I'll tell you a secret, what if Russia is saved, then only through Eurasianism," was uttered shortly before his death in 1992. (Tleugabylova et.al. 2014: 288)

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the proficient young scholar A. G. Dugin became acquainted with Eurasianism, embarking on the development of his ideas that eventually gave rise to a new iteration known as neo-Eurasianism. The foundation of neo-Eurasianism is closely linked to the Eurasian rationale for Russia's distinct trajectory. The significant surge in interest in Eurasianism around the transition from the 1980s to the 1990s can be largely attributed to the collapse of communist ideology, which had served as the ideological underpinning for unifying the various peoples of Russia under a single state throughout the Soviet era. It was during the post-Soviet era that Eurasianism found its way into the political discourse of Russia and several Central Asian states. Exploring the concept of Eurasianism has become a trend not confined to Russia alone. In 1994, the former President of Kazakhstan, N. Nazarbayev, also introduced this idea. The inauguration of the L. N. Gumilev Eurasian University in Astana took place in 2000, attended by both N. A. Nazarbayev and V.

V. Putin. While in the 1920s Eurasianism sought to supersede Bolshevism as the prevailing ideology, the 1990s saw a resurgence of interest in Eurasianism among politicians and intellectuals seeking an alternative to the prevailing Westernism of the time. Additionally, Eurasianism has been utilized to serve as an "intellectual cover" for "anti-Americanism" in political Russia, a phenomenon noted in the early 2000. (Belyakov 2008: 413)

The Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, preceding empires like that of Genghis Khan, the Blue Horde, and earlier entities such as the Scythian empires in this region, all represent diverse manifestations of a unified civilizational principle. This is rooted in the ancient heritage of Eurasia, which predates not only Slavic or Russian identities but also extends beyond the eras of Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. Consequently, all these forms that brought together Eurasia share a common essence—a distinct territory not assimilated into European, Chinese, Iranian, Indian, or Semitic civilizations. This region stands as a completely distinct zone, historically binding together various peoples under different ideological systems. Throughout history, it has consistently been recognized as Eurasia or the Great Turan. Eurasia embodies a civilization with an extensive and ancient history that spans across epochs.

In the three decades since the USSR's dissolution, the post-Soviet space has witnessed intricate and dynamic processes. These have been characterized by simultaneous occurrences of opposing trends. On one hand, there have been centripetal movements fostering integration within the CIS region, while on the other hand, centrifugal forces have spurred disintegration processes. Almost immediately, the CIS region drew the attention of major international players, each aiming to safeguard their distinct interests in this area. (Kurylev, 2023)

This led to the stratification of the post-Soviet space, resulting in countries aligning themselves in various directions. Some nations foresee their future tied closely with Russia, while others prioritize deep cooperation with the Western collective led by the United States. There are countries declaring their neutral stance and those navigating between different power centers based on international, regional, and domestic circumstances. The first group comprises states like Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. These countries engage in various integration frameworks alongside Russia, such as the EAEU and the CSTO. The second group encompasses Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—countries opting for development not only within the Western paradigm of values and interests but also initiating alternative integration processes within the CIS without Russia's involvement and, at times, against its interests. Turkmenistan stands alone in the third group, having declared a neutral status acknowledged by a UN General Assembly resolution. Lastly, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan belong to the fourth group, endeavoring to pursue a multi-directional foreign policy.

The categorization of these countries remains somewhat arbitrary because regardless of their assigned group, each CIS state primarily prioritizes its individual national interests. Even among those nations aligned within the first group engaged in integration with Russia, there exist substantial disagreements, contradictions, and divergent perspectives, even regarding recent shared history, despite being Russia's closest partners. Additionally, progress in post-Soviet integration efforts has stalled, particularly concerning the potential inclusion of more former Soviet republics. Existing participant countries either lack readiness for deeper integration or are unwilling to pursue it altogether. Therefore, Russia aims to foster genuine and diverse integration processes and endeavors to intensify this progression. (Kurylev, 2023)

The philosophy of Eurasianism envisages a multipolar globalization, aiming to unify all societies and cultures globally, with each component drawing organically from its historical cultural heritage. This philosophy underpins Russia's foreign policy under Vladimir Putin. In this context, liberal institutions exert minimal influence on the actual foreign policy, which Putin personally and independently drives. Within this framework, the objective impact of Eurasianism is notably substantial. (Dugin 2022: 142—152)

Putin asserts that Russia isn't a passive entity but a proactive player in global politics—an assertion that encapsulates the essence of the idea of Russia as a sovereign center, independent and distinct from the West. Putin's policy framework aligns with this perspective, fundamentally rooted in this position of independence, reflecting the core Eurasian principle: Russia as a separate civilization from the West. Furthermore, Vladimir Putin is increasingly striking a balance between Western alignments and relations with Eastern powers like China, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and India. To some extent, the Russian president operates both as a Eurasian advocate and a realist. These perspectives don't inherently contradict each other; rather, realism aligns with state interests, while the Eurasian view is rooted in cultural and civilizational aspects. Yet, Putin is increasingly gravitating towards civilization and values, rejecting neoliberal dominance based on this premise, which distinctly embodies a purely Eurasian approach unrelated to the state's functioning. At the state level, he upholds sovereignty, representing a pragmatic model that doesn't clash with Eurasianism. (Dugin 2002: 800)

Eurasianism initially took shape as a political ideology in 1994 when President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan suggested the formation of a Eurasian Union involving Belarus and Russia. Despite the impracticality of the idea, this ideology persisted until 2011, when Russian President Vladimir Putin introduced the "Eurasianism" Concept. This blueprint endorsed the creation of the Eurasian Union, originally proposed by Nazarbayev, with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan as its core members. During that period, Eurasianism was regarded by the leaders of these three nations as the linchpin for integration processes within the post-Soviet landscape. Consequently, the notion of Eurasianism serves as the cornerstone of regional stability, with Russia embodying the link that connects Europe and Asia. (Nazarbayev 1998: 161)

Although the leader of Kazakhstan initially spearheaded the formation of the Eurasian Union, there has been a lingering resistance in our country against participating in the EAEU and drawing closer to Russia. This closeness was primarily perceived as a political alignment. Even presently, there are calls from the people of Kazakhstan to withdraw from the EAEU. However, N. Nazarbayev himself held a positive view of Eurasian integration. In an interview on August 25, 2014, he expressed optimism about the union's future, highlighting its numerous advantages and refuting arguments for pessimism. Nevertheless, the relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan hasn't been straightforward. The Kazakh and Russian leaders contended for leadership roles within the framework of Eurasian integration. For instance, N. Nazarbayev pushed for Astana to be the capital of the EAEU and positioned Kazakhstan as the ideological front-runner of Eurasian integration. Discord exists between Russia and Kazakhstan on a fundamental matter, such as the potential for the EAEU's further expansion. In 2013, Nazarbayev initiated discussions regarding Turkey's potential accession to the EAEU. However, the feasibility of such a move was uncertain as Turkey had been part of the common customs space with the European Union since 1995 and was a NATO member. Yet, the significant aspect here isn't merely Turkey's possible inclusion in the EAEU; rather, it lies in the active interest demonstrated by several countries in modern Eurasia, aiming to extend their sphere of influence into Central Asia. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkey are already aligned within the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States, a forum Kazakhstan views as a prime example of its foreign policy's renowned "multi-vector nature." This approach allows Astana to preserve independence while asserting regional leadership. However, Russia's perspective on this project is cautious. Russian leadership views Kazakhstan's involvement as an attempt to actualize long-standing pan-Turkic ambitions, with experts expressing concerns that Turkic integration structures could create new divisions in the region. In response to Nazarbayev's proposal regarding Turkey, Vladimir Putin suggested in 2013 considering the potential participation of India in the Customs Union and subsequently the EAEU, as Russia engaged in active negotiations on this matter. Kazakhstan's stance, meanwhile, remains complex. Despite Nazarbayev championing the idea of Eurasian

integration over the past two decades, not everyone in Kazakhstan supports the current form of Eurasian integration, particularly expressing wariness toward Russian initiatives in this process. Russia, on its part, has raised queries regarding Kazakhstan's multi-directional policy, including its engagements with Turkey and its growing closeness to the European Union. Notably, Kazakhstan, similar to Belarus, refrained from supporting Russia's retaliatory economic sanctions. (Syzdykova 2012: 153)

The "Great Eurasian Partnership" from a geo-economic standpoint represents Russia's continued pivot toward the East. It aims to foster a comprehensive partnership and strategic involvement with China while actively engaging with Vietnam, ASEAN, and India. Through the concept of the "Great Eurasian Partnership," Russia aims to expand its geopolitical influence. (Temnyshev 2015: 24-25) This consolidation of Eurasia marks the most ambitious integration project of the 21st century. Several foundational principles underpin this initiative. Let's outline some of the key aspects:

Firstly, The "Greater Eurasian Partnership" doesn't intend to rival existing regional integration structures (like ASEAN, EAEU), cross-border economic initiatives (such as One Belt, One Road), or organizations like the SCO.

Secondly, it doesn't position itself as an alliance of the Eurasian East against the European West. Europe is seen as an integral part of Eurasia, with cooperation rather than resistance being the goal.

Thirdly, acknowledging substantial differences in social, political, and economic development models among participants, the partnership accounts for these disparities.

Fourth, flexibility is crucial, allowing individual countries or regional groupings to engage at their own pace and according to their capacities, choosing specific partnership dimensions (trade, finance, infrastructure, visas, etc.).

Fifth, while economic reunification drives the "Great Eurasian Partnership," this economic cooperation inevitably spills over into other areas like science, education, culture, and humanitarian exchanges. (Karaganov 2016)

Moreover, economic integration necessitates parallel efforts in strengthening continental security, addressing issues such as territorial disputes, separatism, arms proliferation, international terrorism, and extremism. Additionally, the initiative emphasizes maximum openness to partners from other global regions, extending invitations to collaborators from Africa, North and South America, among others. The final principle involves constructing the "Partnership" not from top to bottom, but in reverse, from the ground up, starting with specific, even modest agreements among regional integration groups and individual nations. The initial crucial step in establishing this Partnership should focus on finalizing the integration of the EAEU and One Belt, One Road. China was the first nation to respond to Russia's Great Eurasian Partnership initiative. Shortly after the proposal's announcement, Russian President Vladimir Putin conducted a state visit to China on June 25, 2016. In the ensuing "Joint Statement" signed during this visit, both countries advocated for establishing a comprehensive Eurasian partnership grounded in openness, transparency, and mutual interest consideration. They pledged to contribute to enhancing regional integration processes. Eurasia stands as the largest continent globally, encompassing over a third of the planet's total landmass. With more than two-thirds of the world's population, it's also the most densely inhabited. This vast region hosts substantial reserves of natural resources, ranging from oil and gas to freshwater reservoirs and fertile lands. Given these immense resources, it seems fitting for the expansive territories of Eurasia to unify into a cohesive system where diverse geographic components harmoniously complement each other. Primarily, the peoples inhabiting the Eurasian continent stand to gain from such unity. Through this collaboration, they could broaden their perspectives, overcome longstanding fears and biases, and access entirely new prospects for economic, social, and spiritual advancement. Beyond the continent, global benefits would arise from Eurasia's consolidation, becoming a powerful engine of progress capable of propelling other continents forward and significantly contributing to

addressing mankind's global challenges. It's important to note that both the Russian and Chinese initiatives align rather than contradict each other. (Czinpin, 2019)

But in order for the Eurasian Union to become a truly powerful global pole of a multipolar polycentric architecture, Ukraine must necessarily be inside it. This is well understood by geopolitics, including American ones, who unequivocally oppose the strengthening of the role of Russia and Eurasia as a whole in the world. Thus, Zbigniew Brzezinski warned in his articles and books about the need to quarrel Ukraine with Russia by any means in order to deprive this potential bloc of even a theoretical opportunity to become a serious independent force in the future, capable of limiting US interests in this zone of the world and pursuing its own policy independent of the Americans. And it happened. It is certain that Ukraine will not become a member of the Eurasian bloc. If it can be separated and brought under the influence of Atlanticism, the West gains a significant advantage and possesses a potent tool to impede Russia's potential geopolitical resurgence. (Dugin, 2011)


Between 2004 and 2014, Russia's relationship with Ukraine can be categorized into three distinct phases. In the initial period, spanning from 2004 to 2010, relations remained strained with frozen interactions. Russia vehemently opposed Ukraine's NATO membership and issued warnings against its pursuit. Additionally, efforts were made to impede Ukraine's NATO aspirations, including exerting pressure on the Naftogaz company, canceling gas deliveries, and withholding the appointment of a new ambassador. Moving to the second phase from 2010 onwards, Russia's Black Sea Fleet transitioned into a limited partnership in 2013, extending its lease of the base until 2042. During this period, Russia escalated gas prices and pressured Ukraine to join the customs union. Ongoing pressures were also applied to Naftogaz. In the third phase, spanning from February to August 2014, a deconfliction process was initiated. Russia refused to recognize the newly formed government in Kiev, seized and annexed Crimea amidst unrest, stationed Russian troops along Ukraine's borders, and supported protesters within Ukraine. Consequently, all forms of assistance and energy discounts from Russia to Ukraine were terminated. In shaping its approach, Russia sought to cultivate a conscious society in Ukraine by supporting ethnic Russians and integrating them into Russian culture. This was manifested through initiatives like Ruskii Mir and the Eurasian Youth Movement. Employing hybrid methods, Russia utilized local individuals in various capacities, including demonstrators, occupiers, and soldiers, and ultimately activated military units in the later stages of the conflict. (Aksoy 2022: 479)

The fourth phase involves the conflict between Russia and Ukraine in 2022. Although the duration of this war remains uncertain, it is evident that Ukraine, by preserving the integrity of its territory and resisting Russia, will not become a part of the Eurasian space. Is this the reason why Moscow cannot merely eliminate Ukraine from the integration initiative and the overall process of constructing the Eurasian Union? To achieve success, Moscow must find a resolution to the Ukrainian issue.

The location of the Eurasian states on the World Values Survey World Values Map. (World Value Survey, 2020)



## The Inglehart-Welzel World Cultural Map 2023



If you look at the Inglehart values map (Fig. 1), you can see that the Eurasian countries are in the range from -1.7 to -0.5 on the scale of "survival of self-expression", which means a strong emphasis on economic and physical security. Russia, as the most militarily powerful force in the region, can play on these fears. For example, there are territorial disputes between the countries of the region, the effect of which can be offset by integration. The European Union is a good example in this regard. According to T. Gross, Minister for the Main Areas of Integration and Macroeconomics of the Eurasian Economic Commission, European history is the history of wars. Europe united in order not to fight (Valovaya, 2020). Countries were ready to give up part of their sovereignty so that the destructive conflicts of the twentieth century would not repeat. The same mechanism can be effective in the Eurasian space. However, here again there are some obstacles. First, the countries of the region continue to show distrust of Russia's actions. In addition, as mentioned earlier, for some countries, Russia, with its military power, is a danger. Secondly, there are already organizations in the Eurasian space created to solve security problems, in particular, the CSTO, the SCO and various structures within the CIS. Thirdly, competition from China has been increasing in this area recently. Until the mid-2010's, Russia remained the most important partner of the countries of the region in the fields of security and military-technical cooperation. However, China has recently become more active, which until now had focused only on economic relations with the states of the region. In particular, China's security assistance to Tajikistan has grown rapidly over the past few years. This event is an important signal that Russia is gradually losing its influence in Central Asia.

### Conclusion

The post-Soviet interest in Eurasianism amidst geopolitical turmoil didn't result in substantial theoretical advancements. Bridging the ideas of the 1920s with the contemporary context demanded extensive scholarly investigation, which unfortunately never occurred. Politicians across ideologies, from liberals to Democrats, cherry-picked Eurasian concepts to serve narrow party agendas without comprehending their essence. The prevalent views among Neo-Eurasians tend to be speculative and philosophically oriented, detached from the present socio-economic and political landscape in the post-Soviet sphere. They largely ignore external factors, like the policies of the United States and the European Union, in individual CIS countries. Consequently, most neo-Eurasian projects appear utopian.

Based on the above, it can be concluded that in the modern realities of Russia it will be difficult to promote its integration project. So, what mechanisms can help Russia in

promoting Eurasian integration? First, it is the strengthening and development of its "soft power" potential. There are two ways here: the Western one is to create an attractive image that helps spread Western culture and values around the world, and the Chinese one is an economic path that implies huge financial influence in other countries. However, as the experience of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine shows, Russia lacks an attractive cultural resource for the first option of "soft power", which is inferior to the Western one. In the second case, Russia loses economically to China, because it does not have so many free financial resources. It follows from this that Russia needs internal political and economic reforms. Within the framework of increasing the attractiveness of Russia, it is also necessary to intensify cooperation with the countries of Eurasia in the field of higher education. Despite the fact that Russia is quite actively working in this direction, offering good programs and scholarships to students from neighboring countries, nevertheless, in recent years, students from CIS countries have been increasingly attracted by the opportunity to study in Europe, the USA or China. Thus, Russia needs to improve the quality of educational services by attracting the best students from neighboring countries to educate future elites. Another alarming bell here is the reduction of the Russian-speaking space, as well as the plans of a number of states to abandon the Cyrillic alphabet in favor of the Latin alphabet, which indicates a gradual decline in Russian influence in the post-Soviet space.

To genuinely gauge the potential for the Eurasian space's development and Russia's pivotal role, an integrated approach combining theoretical, historical, political, economic, geographical, legal, and other studies is necessary. Eurasian philosophy found traction only within the post-Soviet realm, explaining its geographical, geopolitical, and cultural-civilizational evolution. The deteriorating relations between Russia and the West prompted a state reorientation toward the post-Soviet sphere, crucial for internal security and the pursuit of geopolitical interests at a regional level.

Globalization, driven by scientific and technological progress and bolstered by the information revolution, has stimulated international labor division, fostering cooperation among countries. However, its consequences are ambiguous due to heterogeneous socio-economic development among Eurasian states. Industrialized nations steer globalization to their advantage, widening the gap in socio-economic development between highly advanced and peripheral countries, contributing to a unipolar world. Regionalization, embraced by peripheral nations, aims to collectively address the risks of globalization. Deepening regionalization in Eurasia correlates with the growing bipolarization between the dominant superpowers—the United States and China. Integration unions formed by Eurasian states represent emerging growth poles, potentially transitioning from a unipolar to a multipolar world. The bipolar world is yielding to a polycentric international relations system, emphasizing shared responsibility across nations amidst exacerbated global challenges and respecting regional nuances.

Presently, global economic stability faces threats due to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. According to "neo-Eurasianism," the pivotal conflict in world history revolves around the clash between collectivist, traditionalist Eurasian land states (tellurocracies), and individualistic, liberal Atlantic maritime forces (thalassocracies). The ongoing struggle between their current leaders, Russia and America, is seen as the culminating battle of the "Endkampf," encompassing both internal socio-cultural revolution in "tellurocratic" nations and a global geopolitical revolution.

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## **ҚАЛЫПТАСУ ЖӘНЕ ЭВОЛЮЦИЯ ЕУАЗИЯЛЫҚ ОЙЛАР МЕН ТҮСІНІКТЕР**

**Аннотация:** "Еуразияшылдық" ұғымы посткеңестік кеңістіктің бірлігі мен оның ерекше батыстық емес даму жолына баса назар аудара отырып, 20 ғасырдың басындағы

философиялық идеяларға негізделген. Жалпы геосаясатта, жаһандық сын-қатерлер мемлекеттерді қолданыстағы әлемдік тәртіпті қайта қарау қажеттілігінің алдына қойды. Бұл еуразияшылдық идеясын аймақтық тұрғыдан жүзеге асыру үшін қолайлы жағдай жасайды. Бүгінгі таңда Еуразияшылдық идеясы ТМД және ЕАЭО шеңберінде институттандырылған, әсіресе жаңа жаһандық сын-қатерлер (экономикалық тұрақсыздық, халықаралық тәртіптің өзгеру сипаты, эпидемиологиялық қауіп және т.б.) жағдайында өзекті болып табылады.), бұл жаңа әлемдік тәртіптің пайда болуы туралы айтуға мүмкіндік береді. Мақалада сонымен қатар жаһандану мен аймақтандыру процестерінің өзара байланысы призмасы арқылы Еуразиялық экономиканың дамуы қарастырылады. Жаһандану әлемдік экономиканы интернационалдандырудың объективті процесі ретінде түсіндіріледі. Жаһанданудың субъективті жағы әлемнің дамыған елдерінің өз мүдделері үшін экономикалық саясатының нысаны ретінде және оның салдары ретінде қарастырылады. Еуразия елдерінің экономикаларында аймақтандыру тенденциялары туралы жазылды. Өсіп келе жатқан аймақтандыру объективті түрде жаһандануға қарағанда айтарлықтай өзгеше әлемдік тәртіпке, көпполярлы әлемге әкелетіні дәлелденді.

**Түйінді сөздер:** Еуразияшылдық, Үлкен Еуразия, батыстық емес халықаралық теория, геосаясат, эпистема.

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## **ФОРМИРОВАНИЕ И ЭВОЛЮЦИЯ ЕВРАЗИЙСКИХ МЫСЛЕЙ И КОНЦЕПЦИЙ**

**Аннотация:** концепция "евразийства" основана на философских идеях начала XX века, с акцентом на единство постсоветского пространства и его особый, незападный путь развития. В последнее время сила мирового порядка подверглась испытанию: глобальные вызовы поставили государства перед необходимостью пересмотра существующего миропорядка, что создает благоприятные условия для региональной реализации идеи евразийства. Сегодня идея евразийства институционализована в рамках СНГ и ЕАЭС и особенно актуальна в контексте новых глобальных вызовов (экономическая нестабильность, характер изменений в международном порядке, эпидемиологические угрозы и т.д.), что позволяет говорить о становлении нового мирового порядка. В статье также рассматривается развитие евразийской экономики через призму взаимосвязи процессов глобализации и регионализации. Глобализация трактуется как объективный процесс интернационализации мировой экономики, раскрывающий особенности вовлечения в нее экономических стран Евразии. Субъективная сторона глобализации показана как форма экономической политики развитых стран мира в собственных интересах. Выявлены тенденции регионализации в экономических странах Евразии. В отличие от глобализации усиливающаяся регионализация объективно приводит к существенно иному мировому порядку - к многополярному миру.

**Ключевые слова:** Евразийство, Большая Евразия, незападная теория международных отношений, геополитика, эпистема.